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This paper analyzes the emerging literature on the determinants of
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variables for previous experimental results on the friendship effect.
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Resumen
En este artículo se analiza la literatura reciente sobre los determinantes
del altruismo en el marco de una red social. Se proponen dos variables
explicativas para racionalizar resultados experimentales relativos al
denominado efecto amistad. La primera de ellas es la integración so-
cial, que tiene un impacto positivo sobre la generosidad. La segunda
variable es estratégica y está basada en la reciprocidad: la posibilidad
de recibir favores ex.post. El análisis econométrico que realizamos
muestra que las dos variables tienen un efecto positivo y significativo.
Palabras clave: donaciones, redes sociales, reciprocidad, integración
social.
Clasificación JEL: C91, D64, Z13.
Introduction
The role of socialization in altruistic behavior is a growing topic in
experimental literature. Seminal papers in this field (Hoffman et al.,
1996 and Hoffman et al., 1994 or Bohnet and Frey, 1999) explore the
effect of “social distance” on giving, i.e. how the subjects’ perception
of the recipient as close or distant, in moral terms, affects the outcome;
the result is that proximity plays a crucial role in explaining generosity.
Although the first papers on this issue interpreted this social aspect as a
matter of framing, a number of subsequent papers have dealt with pure
social issues focussing on the attributes of recipients.
This literature started with Eckel and Grossman (1996), who analyzed
how individuals behave when the recipient is a well–known and re-
puted institution: the Red Cross. This line of research regarding the
recipient’s identity continued with Burham (2003), who endow dicta-
tors with pictures of the recipients, Charness and Gneezy1, who give
recipients’ names to proposers, and Brañas-Garza (2006), who inform
1 Charness and Gneezy (forthcoming). “What’s in a name? Anonymity and social distance in
dictator and ultimatum games”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 245-260.
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dictators about recipients’ poverty levels. The research dealing with
social framing includes also Frohlich et al. (2001) who analyzes how
the presence of recipients (in front of dictators) increases the credibil-
ity of the experiment and social proximity and, thus, giving. As shown
in Hoffman et al. (1996) proximity between the participants and the
experimenter and between subjects is a key variable in explaining
social behavior. In fact when the two variables are reduced to the
minimun, giving approximates the game theoretical prediction, i.e.
zero (see Camerer, 2003; Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Kurki, 2004 and
Meier, 2006 for more detailed expositions of dictator game results).
However, the social side of altruism is not yet well understood. Al-
though the number of experimental papers studying altruism is over-
whelming, there are very few articles connecting social networks2 and
generous behavior. Note that the social side of altruism, if it matters
at all, affects a key question: if altruism is socially based then any
policy increasing interactions between individuals could be used as a
device for promoting cooperation3. In this paper we address this issue
in the light of existing experimental evidence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we examine
previous work on the relationship between social networks and giv-
ing and present empirical regularities across experiments. It turns out
that the evidence is somewhat contradictory. Therefore, in Section II
we analyze the features which may explain the differences in the re-
sults and test our conjectures with a regression analysis. In Section III
we discuss our main conclusion: reciprocity and social integration are
the main determinants of giving.
I. Social networks: an emerging literature
The starting point of this literature is a well established experimental
result: the larger the social distance the smaller the level of donations
2 A recent survey on network literature is Jackson (2006).
3 These ideas could be applied in the area of human resources management. If altruism is
desirable within a firm, and provided experimental literature can show that altruism is socially
based, then organizing social acivities for the weekend would be a good business idea.248
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(see Hoffman et al., 1996). Recently, there has been a stream of papers
seeking a complementary result (that which relates social integration
with greater altruism). To our knowledge, there are very few papers
focussing on the link between latent4 social networks and altruism5.
As we will show in this section, there are two key ingredients in this
literature: the network elicitation procedures and the matching proc-
ess between subjects. The latter is controlled in order to explore so-
cial issues: integration, friendship, favoritism, etc.
Let us introduce some concepts.
Definition 1 (Fi) Network of friends is the set ({Fi}i∈N, N). In words,
each participant i declares who his/her friends are within the set N.
We denote by Fi the set of friends and by fi = |Fi| the number of friends.
The members of N not in Fi will be called strangers6 for i; the set of
strangers for i is thus: Si = N \ Fi.
Example 1 F1 = {2, 3}, F2 = {1}, F3 = {1, 4}, F4 = {3}, F5 = φ, F6 = {2, 3}.
Figure 1 represents this network.
Two additional definitions will be useful: the first connects the exist-
ing literature on the dictator game with this new literature7 and the
second is based on network measures.
4 These experiments do not create or promote social networks between participants; they
just elicit the social network existing prior to the experiment.
5 We do not include here designs of the “come to the lab with your friend” type (see Reuben,
2006 for an extensive discussion). Observe that these designs do not elicit a complete
network.
6 Note that Si contains the set of friends of i’s friends not in Fi, or more precisely the set of
k > 1 neighbors for i, while Fi includes all k = 1 neighbors. In many cases, k = 2 for
instance, these neighbors are not strangers at all (see Vega–Redondo, 2005).
7 See Dufwemberg and Muren (2006) for a discussion.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 245-260.
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Figure 1. Example 1.
Definition 2 (SPi) Social proximity is a measure of the distance be-
tween i (dictator) and j (recipient). In our context social proximity
may take on values in the interval [0, 1]: 0 (if j ∈ Si); 1 (if j ∈ Fi and
the identity of the recipient is known for sure); 1/fi (if j ∈ Fi and the
identity of the recipient is unknown).
Definition 3 (SIi) Social integration of player i is a measure of his/her
outstanding cooperation links.
Players with high levels of social integration are involved in long-run
relationships where cooperation is sustainable. This is highly corre-
lated with the number of friends, or degree-out, |Fi|, and individual
centrality measures. The initial paper in this literature is undoubtedly
that of Mobius, Rosenblat and Quoc-Anh (2005) (hereafter MRQ). To
elicit the social network at Harvard dorms MRQ use a coordination
device (with monetary incentives) that lets subjects choose friends
from a list and offers a prize (with some probability) when subjects
coordinate naming each other (see Table 1)8
.
8 A recent paper by Haan, Koreman and Riemersma (2006) uses “inside” information from
teachers to elicit the social network in a group of children.250
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Table 1. Network Elicitation Device.
Device Population
MRQ Coordination with rewards Univ. Students
BDE Survey with benefit-your-friend Econ. Students
GMMTY Survey Fifth & Sixth Graders
BCJP Coordination with rewards + punisment Econ. Students
BCEJP Survey with benefit-your-friend Econ. Students
Once the network is obtained, MRQ check whether subjects are will-
ing to increase their donation (in dictator games) when they are
matched with a friend as recipient. Thus, the key difference between
their work and previous dictator game literature is that they “control”
the matching process (i. e. social proximity) with precise information
on the previously elicited network. Given that they can measure the
distance between subjects, they control donations by the existing out-
standing relation between them. MRQ study whether a subject’s
behavior changes when he/she faces a friend as recipient, that is, when
the level of social distance (between players) is reduced to the mini-
mum. This is precisely the opposite case to Hoffman et al. 1994, 1996,
where the individual has no information about the recipient and thus
the social distance is maximum. The result is clear:
R1: Social proximity (being matched to a friend instead of a stranger)
increases giving.
To be more precise, in one of their treatments MRQ’s subjects are
informed that they will be matched to a specific friend (see Table 2).
From the whole set of i’s friends, Fi, he/she will play with a precise
element of the set, j. In what follows, we denote by pi(f ) the probabil-
ity of i being matched to an element in Fi and by pi(j) the probability
of being matched to a specific element. Under this experimental de-
sign, dictators know their recipients’ identity and typically, they also
have information about personal characteristics (for instance, their
income, their needs, etc.) that may affect social proximity.
MRQ also deal with the topic of social integration. They define a clus-
tering–related measure (named strength) based on connected friends: it
is an index which captures the number of friends that two individuals
share. Concerning social integration they obtain a second crucial result:58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 245-260.
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R2: Social integration (as measured by the strength of the link) in-
creases generosity.
In sum, MRQ show that the greater the social integration and the
greater the social proximity, the greater the level of donations.
Table 2. Matched to a friend.
pi( f) pi( j)
MRQ 1 1
BDE 1 0 < pi( j) ≤ 1
GMMTY explores ALL cases
BCJ P 0 ≤ pi( f ) ≤ 1 0 < pi( j) ≤ 1
BCEJ P 0 or1 0 < pi( j) ≤ 1
Given MRQ’s matching mechanism there are two other variables
mixed with social proximity and social integration that could be driv-
ing the results. First, the design does not enable a distinction to be
made as to whether subjects give more because the recipient is a close
friend or simply because they know the recipient’s identity and his/
her personal characteristics. Note in this respect that very recent
literature shows that dictator giving is extremely sensitive to informa-
tion regarding the recipient’s identity (see Charness and Gneezy9 or
Frohlich et al., 2001) and his/her attributes (see Brañas-Garza, 2006).
Second, since dictators know the recipient’s identity, there is room for
reciprocity: players could obtain ex-post benefits from their dona-
tions (see Rabin, 1993).
Brañas-Garza, Durán and Espinosa (2005) (BDE) partially solve these
problems regarding the information about the recipient. To obtain Fi
for each player i, subjects are asked (using a different elicitation de-
vice10, see Table 1) for a list of their close friends. Once the whole
social network is obtained each subject is matched to a friend –as in
9 Charness and Gneezy (forthcoming). “What’s in a name? Anonymity and social distance in
dictator and ultimatum games”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
10 The benefit-your-friend incentive device: subjects were asked to write down the name of
their classmate friends who “may have the chance to benefit later in the experiment”. No
information was provided about the type of decisions they would make afterwards. The
instructions clearly stated that they might be given the chance to benefit only one of their
friends (randomly chosen) so that the more friends they listed, the lower the chance of
benefiting any particular individual was.252
Altruism with Social Roots: An Emerging Literature
Pablo Brañas–Garza y María Paz Espinosa
MRQ– with the only difference that they do not know with whom;
dictators know only that they will play with a friend in Fi (which im-
plies pi(f) = 1 and 0 < pi(j) ≤ 1, see Table 2). Then they are informed
that they will play with any randomly chosen close friend, that is any
element of Fi. Observe that although pi(f) = 1 the probability of being
matched with a specific friend j is less than 1, in particular pi(j) = 1/fi,
with fi being the total number of friends11. In contrast, the baseline
treatment comprises dictators playing with strangers.
Note that pi(j) ≤ 1 implies on the one hand that reciprocity has less
importance since the dictator does not know exactly who the recipi-
ent is (and therefore obtaining ex-post benefits is made more diffi-
cult), and on the other hand it eliminates the effect that knowledge of
the recipient’s identity may have on the dictator. Interestingly, even
though direct reciprocity and knowledge of identity are removed, there
is still a friendship effect in BDE, in a similar direction to that re-
ported by MRQ:
R1’: In the absence of direct reciprocity, social proximity increases
giving.
Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell, Tromp and Yariv (2006) (GMMTY) con-
ducted a survey among 10-12 year old girls in Pasadena, eliciting
friendship relations among these fifth and sixth graders (see Table 1)
as well as a large number of personal attributes. An interesting feature
is that subjects play 10 different dictator game decisions with recipi-
ents at different social distances –from the dictators– although only
one of the decisions is implemented (randomly).
As in MRQ the matching mechanism explores different relations be-
tween players: friends, friends of friends and greater social distances.
This procedure allows proximity to be graduated more accurately and
enables the effect of spatial measures of intensity of relations on gen-
erosity to be analyzed. Their study of giving as a function of distance
between players yields a clear result: there are large and significant
effects of (social) distance on giving. They also control for the dicta-
11 p( j) = 1 only for those subjects with fi = 1.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 245-260.
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tor’s personal features (such us popularity, shyness, race, height, etc.)
and conclude that social distance variables are much more important
than personal variables12. In short,
R1”: Controlling for personal features, the shorter the social distance
the greater the giving. Social proximity has higher predictive power
than dictators’ personal attributes.
Brañas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes, Espinosa, Jiménez and Ponti (2006)
(BCEJP) explore the effect of social integration, measured through sev-
eral network indexes, on dictator giving. This paper elicits a social net-
work within a group of students pursuing a BA in Economics (see Table
1) which is later used to analyze altruism in terms of dictator giving13.
The matching mechanism is controlled in order to create two specific
environments: subjects may face either friends or strangers (see Table 2)
but even in the first case subjects do not know the identity of the recipi-
ent, that is, pi(j) is positive but not equal to one14. The elicitation of the
latent social network allows to measure social integration using standard
network indexes –see Vega–Redondo (2005): clustering15, degree16 and
betweenness17 (a centrality measure). This paper obtains a salient result:
R2”: Social integration (as measured by betweenness) is positively
related to giving.
This result is relevant because it separates the pure effect of social
integration from the effect of reciprocity and the friendship effect. It
shows that with no potential gains in terms of reciprocity, more inte-
grated individuals are willing to cooperate more. In short, social inte-
gration seems to have a positive effect on giving which is independent
12 GMMTY also explore the importance of personal variables for network formation.
13 Brañas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes, Jiménez and Ponti (2006) (BCJP) provide a detailed discussion
about experimental procedures for network elicitation. They compare simple devices, such
as surveys, with other more sophisticated ones such as the benefit-your-friend device,
reward+punishment coordination games, etc.
14 An exception is an individual who reveals that everyone else is his/her friend: fi = n - 1 then
pi(f ) = 1 but pi( j) takes the minimum value 1/(n - 1).
15 A measure of the likelihood that two friends of the subject in a node are friends of each other.
16 The count of the number of ties to other agents in the network.
17 The number of people who a person is connected to indirectly through their direct links.254
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from reciprocity and from the friendship effect. This is interesting in
the sense that in a setting where there is no room for strategic behavior,
at least in the short term, individuals with high social integration find
it in their interest to be generous18.
II. Puzzles
The above literature reports some alternative sources of social giving:
whereas GMMTY, MRQ and BDE support the friendship effect (so-
cial proximity), which explains why individuals always help those
subjects linked to them, BCEJP focus on social integration regardless
of social proximity.
To shed some light on this question, we use previous experimental
data (BDE) but control for social integration and other variables re-
garding the matching mechanism. In the BDE design, after the net-
work elicitation stage individuals play a dictator game either with a
randomly chosen friend or with a stranger. The subjects know whether
pi( f ) = 1 or pi( f ) = 0; however, they do not have information about
the recipient’s identity, 0 < pi( j) ≤ 1.
We use the following explanatory variables:
• Social Proximity: pi( f ) is a dummy variable which takes the value
1 if the subject faces a friend for sure or 0 whenever he/she faces
a stranger.
• Social Integration: fi or degree - out is the number of friends that
the individual has in the network, i.e. the number of links arising
from the subject, |Fi|.
• Reciprocity: pi( j) is the probability of being matched to a specific
friend; this variable takes the following values.
for pi( f ) = 0 → pi( j) = 0
for pi( f ) = 1 → pi( j) = 1/fi
18 It is worth noting that an alternative measure of social integration, degree–out, turns out
not to be statistically significant in explaining giving. In this respect see also the discussion
at the end (Section III).58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 245-260.
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Table 3 presents summary statistics for the regression variables.
Using these three variables we estimate the impact of social proximity,
social integration and reciprocity on giving. As expected, there are
high correlations between variables (ρpi(f )pi(j) = 0.69, ρpi( f )fi = -0.34 &
ρfi pi( j) = -0.32) which may indicate multicollinearity.
Table 3. Variables and Descriptives.
Mean Median Mode Max/Min n
pi( f ): Social Proximity 0.49 0 0 1/0 53
fi: Degree-out 2.79 3 4 7/0 53
pi( j): Reciprocity 0.21 0 0 1/0 53
Giving 2.96 3 0/519 6/0 53
Table 4 presents the regression results. Columns 1 to 3 explore each
variable separately. The effect of degree-out on giving is marginal
and both social proximity and reciprocity are highly significant. Also
note that the latter has a coefficient which is twice as high as that of
the former.
To explore in depth the effects of reciprocity and social integration
we use pi( j), a variable which assigns value zero to those individuals
who knew they were never going to be matched to a friend and the
inverse of degree-out (1/fi) for subjects facing friends. Given the
multicollinearity problem we must study social proximity and reci-
procity separately. Column 4 jointly explores social proximity and
integration and column 5 uses social integration and reciprocity. The
results are clear: the model presented in column 5 is highly explanatory.
Furthermore, the model presented in column 6 (with high
multicollinearity) suggests that social proximity offers no additional
predictive power once social integration and reciprocity are included
in the regression. In sum, regressions 5 & 6 show that pi( j) has a
positive and significant coefficient but pi( f) has no effect when both fi
and pi( j) have been introduced. So there is no friendship effect on
giving once degree-out and reciprocity have been taken into account.
19 For subjects playing with strangers and friends respectively.256
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The interaction between social proximity and integration (column 7)
captures the number of friends when the subject is playing with a friend.
Note that this is an alternative measure of reciprocity (and thus highly
correlated to pi(j)) which is highly significant in explaining giving.
Table 4. Giving Regressions.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
c 2.48 2.55 2.68 1.72 1.80 1.61 2.57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
pi( f ) 0.98 - - 1.24 0.49 -
(0.04) (0.01) (0.44)
fi - - 0.09 0.22 0.23 0.22 -
(0.48) (0.12) (0.09) (0.07)
pi( j) - 1.92 - - 2.35 1.84 -
(0.01) (0.00) (0.07)
fi * pi( f ) - - - - - - 0.36
(0.02)
n 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
R
—2 0.059 0.097 0.009 0.084 0.130 0.123 0.080
(*) p-values in parentheses.
These results can be interpreted as follows:
Even though a friendship effect is observed in the experimental data,
this effect is mixed with two other variables: reciprocity (the possibil-
ity of ex-post favor trading) and social integration (the number of
outstanding cooperative links).
When fi is included in the regression to capture social integration it is
weakly significant. This is because on the one hand, when a subject is
matched to a friend reciprocity is a decreasing function of the number
of links fi, so that more isolated agents should give more. Thus, giving
induced by strategic reasons (by the possibility of tracing the recipi-
ent and obtaining ex-post favors) is a decreasing function of fi. On the
other hand, subjects with higher social integration are more likely to
give more since they have outstanding long run cooperation relations.
This second effect goes exactly in the opposite direction: subjects
with higher social integration have more friends and give more.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 245-260.
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Note that pi( j) is decreasing in degree-out ( fi) and therefore pi( j)
also simultaneously contains the effect of reciprocity and the effect of
social integration.
III. Discussion
This paper analyzes the determinants of giving within a social net-
work. After a detailed survey of this emerging literature we propose
two main explanatory variables for previous experimental results.
The first variable is strategic and is based on reciprocity, the possibil-
ity of ex-post favors (a second stage outside the lab added to the one-
shot dictator game and not controlled by the experimenter). The second
is the level of social integration measured by degree-out.
In our data set both these variables are highly and positively corre-
lated to giving, with the former being more significant in the regres-
sion analysis.
The reason why our measure of integration seems to be less relevant
than reciprocity is that its relation with giving might not be linear. To
illustrate this idea consider the most extreme cases in terms of
socialization: i) the most integrated subject, i.e. a subject who has
links with all the individuals in the network (degree – out = n – 1),
and ii) the subject with the lowest (positive) number of links in the
network (that is, degree – out = 1). Our point is that in these two
salient cases individuals will tend to be particularly generous: in the
first case due to the social integration variable and in the second due
to reciprocity. Let us elaborate on this idea.
First, consider a regular dictator game in N, with pi(f) < 1 and 0 ≤ pi(j) < 1
with the most integrated individual, degree – out = n – 1. It is easy to
check that the higher the level of integration the higher pi( f) is, i.e.
pi( f) increases with fi. Then, in the extreme case of pi( f ) = 1 subjects
know they will be playing with a friend on their list. This argument
provides an explanation for those results regarding the subject’s so-
cial integration: A highly integrated individual always matches with a
friend, so that he/she receives back part of his/her giving at least in
the form of outstanding cooperation.258
Altruism with Social Roots: An Emerging Literature
Pablo Brañas–Garza y María Paz Espinosa
Second, the dominant variable for relatively isolated subjects is not
social integration but reciprocity. Consider an individual playing a
dictator game under the condition pi( f ) = 1 and 0 < pi(j) ≤ 1. The
subjects play with friends but they do not know with whom. It is not
difficult to see that the lower the integration is the higher pi(j) is, i.e. pi(j)
decreases with fi. In the extreme case, when the subject has only one
friend, fi = 1, pi(j) = 1, we are back to MRQ conditions. When pi(j) = 1,
after playing the game these subjects may communicate with their part-
ners and get ex-post favors in exchange for giving. Note that the smaller
the number of links is the larger the probability of favor trading is.
This discussion provides an explanation for previous experimental
results concerning giving and social network characteristics. In fact,
the econometric analysis of the two variables using previous experi-
mental data indicates that reciprocity and social integration are posi-
tively related to giving. However, further research would be needed
to establish the direction of causality between social integration and
generosity; it could be the case that more generous individuals tended
also to be more socially integrated and our empirical analysis might
be capturing this positive association.
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